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BREAKING THE MEXICAN
CARTELS: A KEY HOMELAND SECURITY
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
Carrie F. Cordero*
Abstract
Although accurate statistics are hard to come by, it is quite possible that
60,000 people have died in the last six-plus years as a result of armed conflict
between the Mexican cartels and the Mexican government, amongst cartels
fighting each other, and as a result of cartels targeting citizens. And this figure
does not even include the nearly 40,000 Americans who die each year from using
illegal drugs, much of which is trafficked through the U.S.-Mexican border. The
death toll is only part of the story. The rest includes the terrorist tactics used by
cartels to intimidate the Mexican people and government, an emerging point of
view that the cartels resemble an insurgency, the threat—both feared and
realized—of danger to Americans, and the understated policy approach currently
employed by the U.S. government. This short article only scratches the surface
by identifying the Mexican Situation as a pressing U.S. homeland security issue
requiring a renewed strategic effort by the United States over the next four years.
Involving a complex web of foreign policy, law enforcement, intelligence,
military, border security, drug consumption and public policy considerations,
breaking the Mexican cartels is no easy feat. But it is a necessary one to secure
our southern border, eliminate the presence of dangerous cartels in our cities,
reduce Americans’ contribution to the drug trade and resulting violence, and
play our role in restoring the Mexican citizenry to a society free from daily
terror.
I. INTRODUCTION
Homeland security is a post-9/11 concept in the United States. Prior to
9/11, we did not have a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). We did not
even talk about our domestic security in terms of “protecting the homeland.”
Homeland security issues involve a complex web of threats to national security,
domestic preparedness, internal security, the protection of privacy and civil
liberties, and the health and safety of Americans domestically.
There are a number of homeland security issues that will require
attention in the new presidential term. Cybersecurity, for one, is to the next
decade what counterterrorism was to the last: a pressing and urgent need to
develop a legal and policy framework to prevent what could be a catastrophic
event. In the last four years, the homeland security community has recognized
the threat posed by nation states, terrorist groups and organized criminal
networks in the cyber realm. In the summer of 2012, Congress considered
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cybersecurity legislation, but its chances fizzled by the start of fall.1 As we enter
2013, executive action seems likely. As a result, we have, as a legal and policy
community, started to move from the threat recognition stage to the problem
solving stage. But completing this transition and actually solving the
cybersecurity problem is a critical homeland security need as we move forward.
On a more subtle level, the role of government—particularly local
authorities (such as the New York Police Department)—in protecting Americans
from homeland security threats such as home grown, domestic, or international
terrorists will require more attention and debate. The role of the federal
government in such investigations and intelligence activities is subject to a wide
range of laws, Executive Orders, and Executive Branch policy documents that
enable federal authorities to do their job protecting Americans in a framework
that takes into account the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Since 9/11, a
significant debate in Congress and in public has occurred vetting different
perspectives on the appropriate federal role in conducting so-called domestic
intelligence activities, and the laws and policies that govern them. On the other
hand, the framework for local government involvement in these activities is far
less clear, and, while subject to episodic exposure in the media, has not actually
been subject to a substantive public policy debate. It will be hard for lawmakers,
policymakers, and intelligence officials to brush off concerns about these local
intelligence activities for four more years.
This article focuses on an emerging homeland security issue for which
the events on the ground have outrun the current U.S. legal and policy
framework, but which has received relatively subdued attention from not only the
legal and policy communities but scholars and media alike: the Mexican
Situation. Mexico, and how the U.S. Government addresses the threat from drug
cartels on our southern border, just may be the most politically sensitive and
difficult homeland security problem to solve. Why is that?
First, the Mexican Situation is a homeland security issue that involves
long-standing foreign policy sensitivities.2 Unlike homeland security issues that
we can address through purely domestic efforts, it is a U.S. homeland security
issue that must be solved through cooperative efforts here at home and with a
sovereign and allied nation that is also a significant economic partner. Second,
there is not even consensus yet that the Mexican cartels pose a homeland security
problem. Much like international terrorism was pre-9/11, the Mexican Situation
has historically been viewed as a law enforcement problem. Drug users, sellers,
and kingpins alike have all been primarily dealt with through the criminal justice
system. However, with an ineffective Mexican criminal justice system and a
U.S. justice system whose role is not intended to be that of problem solver, the

1

See Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER, BENJAMIN BAHNEY & K. JACK RILEY, RAND CORP., SECURITY IN
MEXICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OPTIONS xxii-xxiii (2009), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf.
2
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limits of the law enforcement approach are increasingly evident. Third, there are
many labels under our laws to deal with the Mexican drug cartels, and those
labels have consequences. As outlined further in this article, Mexican drug
cartels may be, all at once, transnational criminal organizations, international
terrorist organizations, and insurgents under the laws of war. Fourth, issues of
state and local versus federal control and responsibilities, and a federal budget
crisis, get tangled up in the debate over which resources and the amount of
resources to put on the southern border to secure it. States like Texas and
Arizona, who currently have governors ideologically on the side of asserting
state’s autonomy, are, at the same time, frustrated with the amount of federal aid
to secure the border, both in terms of money and manpower. And fifth, breaking
the Mexican cartels requires a government-led and very public dialogue and
recalibration of our views and policies regarding U.S. illegal drug consumption.
Adopting a stronger U.S. policy of breaking the Mexican cartels would require a
sustained commitment to drastically reducing American drug use. Doing so
would require an extraordinary amount of political leadership and moral
courage.3
II. THE MEXICAN SITUATION
A. Terror on the Border
The homeland security community has been forced to steadily increase
its engagement on the issue of how the U.S. legal and policy framework should
address the Mexico Situation. The traditional view has been to treat the Mexican
drug cartels4 like criminal organizations—that is, primarily as a law enforcement
3

The limited legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington State in the November 2012
election cycle makes federal efforts against drug use even more challenging.
4
There are seven main cartels operating in Mexico, with varying degrees of prominence:
(1) Sinaloa Cartel, led by Joaqin “El Chapo” Guzman. Sinaloa operates along the western and
southern areas of Mexico, but also has reach up to the northwest area; (2) Gulf Cartel, led by Osiel
Cardenas-Giullen until his arrest and extradition to the United States in January 2007, and currently
led by Jorge Eduardo Costilla-Sanchez. Gulf operates in northeastern Mexico. It is aligned with
Sinaloa and La Familia against the Zetas; (3) La Familia Michoacana, which is based in
Michoacana, Mexico; (4) Beltran Leyva Organization, whose influence has diminished in recent
years due to the arrests of leadership and killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva in 2010 during an
attempted arrest by the Mexican Navy; (5) Juarez Cartel (a.k.a. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes
Organization), based in Cuidad Juarez, Mexico, which is just over the border from El Paso, Texas.
Juarez has been one of the most violent locations of the cartel wars. As of August 2012, reports
indicate that the Juarez cartel may have been finally marginalized for control of the Juarez
trafficking corridor; (6) Tijuana Cartel (a.k.a. the Arrellano Felix Organization), which operates in
western Mexico, has diminished in dominance due to the arrests of senior leaders as well as the
overpowering by Sinaloa and La Familia; (7) Los Zetas, which were previously the armed and
enforcement wing of the Gulf cartel, have emerged as extremely violent, using particularly
gruesome tactics of torture and murder. The Zetas operate in central and southern Mexico. They
are led by Miguel Trevino-Morales. See, e.g., Major Nagesh Chelluri, A New War on America’s
Old Frontier: Mexico’s Drug Cartel Insurgency, 210 MIL. L. REV. 51, 64-69 (2011); see also
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issue. But, in recent years, the drug cartels have stretched beyond the Italian
mafia model; their activities increasingly are more similar to those of
international terrorist organizations and insurgencies as defined by the laws of
war. According to Steven C. McCraw, Director of the Texas Department of
Public Safety and a former FBI Agent, the Mexican Situation is both a public
safety and national security issue:5
[The cartels] use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry . . . They
employ horrific tactics to intimidate their adversaries and the public
such as decapitations, acid baths, skinning people alive, torture and
Improvised Explosive Devices and they have expanded their criminal
operations to profit from kidnappings, robberies, human trafficking,
extortions, and theft . . . . We continu[e] [to] see multi-ton drug loads
seized throughout Texas.6

In line with McCraw’s description, events of recent years have made
clear that the citizens of Mexico live in terror. Murder, torture, kidnappings, and
extortion are the daily goings-on in Mexico at the direction of the cartels.7 The
average Mexican citizen, law enforcement official, or local public official, may
no longer have a choice whether or not to cooperate with the cartels. When the
choice is to cooperate, or face death of oneself or one’s family, there really is no
choice.8
The frightening security situation is not limited to the Mexican side of
the border. Americans are at risk, too. Sigifredo Gonzalez, the Zapata County,
Texas Sheriff, described in May 2011 how families on the United States side of
Merida Part Two: Insurgency and Terrorism in Mexico: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations,
and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 19-22 (2011) [hereinafter Benson
Statement October 2011] (statement of Rodney G. Benson, Assistant Administrator and Chief of
Intelligence for the Drug Enforcement Administration). One of Los Zetas’ previous leaders,
Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano was killed in October 2012. See Alfredo Corchado, Mexico’s Drug
War Undiminished in Some Areas Close to Texas, Authorities Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan.
12, 2013, 11:09 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/nationworld/mexico/20130112-mexico-sdrug-war-undiminished-in-some-areas-close-to-texas-authorities-say.ece.
5
See On the Border and In the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug
Cartel Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 40 (2011) [hereinafter McCraw Statement May 2011]
(statement of Steven C. McCraw, Director Texas Department of Safety).
6
Id. at 42-43 (stating that equipment used by the cartels is military and nation-grade including:
“communication intercepts, interrogations, trend analysis, secure communications, coordinated
military-style tactical operations, GPS, thermal imagery, and military armaments including fully
automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and hand grenades.”).
7
Craig A. Bloom, Square Pegs in Round Holes: Mexico, Drugs, and International Law, 34 HOUS.
J. INT’L L. 345, 390 (2012) (“It is impossible to know how many people have disappeared, and the
population is scared to ask.”).
8
See William Finnegan, Letter from Mexico: Silver or Lead. The Drug Cartel La Familia Gives
Local Officials a Choice: Take a Bribe or a Bullet, THE NEW YORKER, May 31, 2010, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/05/31/100531fa_fact_finnegan?currentPage=all
(reporting a compelling narrative of Mexican life under the eyes of La Familia).
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the border have bullet holes in their homes and periodically need to hide or
evacuate to avoid cross-border gunfire.9 U.S. citizens have been killed, including
some on official duty (e.g., the February 2011 killing of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Agent Jaime Zapata by Los Zetas), and others
innocently visiting Mexico (e.g., Agustin Roberto “Bobby” Salcedo).10
The U.S. State Department recognizes the extreme risk to Americans
traveling to Mexico. According to the State Department’s travel advisory on
Mexico issued in November 2012, Americans should defer “non-essential” travel
to fifteen of Mexico’s thirty-two states, and exercise caution in at least four
others.11 Mexico is one of only thirty-three countries that the State Department
publishes travel advisories for, and, at ten pages long with a state-by-state
analysis of the dangers posed in each region of the country, is the longest
advisory on the list.12 One hundred and thirteen Americans were murdered in
Mexico in 2011 and thirty-two were murdered in the first six months of 2012.13
Additional threats to Americans in Mexico include kidnappings, disappearances,
armed carjackings, and highway robberies.14 Cartels are known to set up false
checkpoints on Mexican highways,15 and the State Department’s advice is to
cooperate with them.16
Overall, it is difficult to identify how many people in Mexico have been
killed by cartel violence in recent years because the Mexican Government does
not release statistics. Some of the varying estimates include: 28,000 deaths since

9

On the Border and In the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security and Drug
Cartel Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 62 (2011) [hereinafter Gonzalez Statement May 2011]
(statement of Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., Sheriff Zapata County, Texas) (“When people in the United
States fear the cartels in Mexico, even if they are not involved in drug trafficking, but are afraid to
be at the wrong place at the wrong time in their own country, this is terrorism which to me is the
fear of spillover violence.”).
10
See H.R. Res. 1032, 111th Cong. (2010) (narrating the murder of U.S. citizen Agustin Roberto
“Bobby” Salcedo while on vacation in Mexico).
11
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, TRAVEL WARNING – MEXICO (Nov. 20,
2012) [hereinafter TRAVEL WARNING – MEXICO], available at http://travel.state.gov/travel/
cis_pa_tw/tw/ tw_5815.html.
12
Mexico is one of only three nations in the Americas that carries a State Department warning—the
others are Haiti and Colombia. They are in dubious company. The remaining countries on the list
advising against travel for Americans or warning serious caution are: Tunisia, Mali, Syria,
Pakistan, Libya, Israel (the West Bank, and Gaza), Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Central African Republic, Kenya, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Philippines, Mauritania, Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, Algeria, Iran, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Eritrea, Niger, Chad, Yemen, Sudan,
Republic of South Sudan, Guinea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, CURRENT TRAVEL WARNINGS, available at http://travel.
state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
13
TRAVEL WARNING – MEXICO, supra note 11.
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
See id.
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2006;17 43,000 drug-related deaths since 2006;18 over 23,000 drug related deaths
since January 2007;19 12,600 deaths from January 2008-March 2009;20 35,000
since the cartels launched the last several years’ aggression;21 45,000 since
Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched his effort against the cartels,
beginning in early 2007;22 and, as of January 2013, an astounding 60,000
deaths.23 The State Department relies on figures provided by the Mexican
Government, which places the death toll at 47,515 between December 1, 2006
and September 30, 2011.24 There were more than 15,200 drug-related killings in
Mexico in 2010,25 and 12,903 drug-related killings from January to September
2011.26 Although the current wave of cartel wars amongst each other and against
the Mexican Government are roughly considered as beginning circa 2006 when
President Calderón was elected and subsequently deployed the Army against the
cartels, in 2004-2005 there was a “cross-border killing spree” by Gulf Cartelaffiliated Zetas in the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo area.27
A topic of some disagreement is whether the violence has spilled over
the border.28 According to federal officials, it has not29—even though there are
documented incidents in U.S. soil.30 Some scholars and local border officials
disagree with federal officials, and cite to kidnappings, stray bullets, gang
activity, and drug courier attacks on American ranchers as examples that the
problems are not only on the Mexican side of the border.31 According to one
report, the cartels, either through direct representatives or affiliated gangs have a

17

Chelluri, supra note 4, at 53-54.
Benson Statement October 2011, supra note 4, at 22.
19
Finnegan, supra note 8.
20
H.R. Res. 1032, 111th Cong. (2010).
21
Mark Mazzetti & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Role in Mexican Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2011, at A1.
22
Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Its Role in Battle Against Mexico’s Drug Cartels, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2011, at A1.
23
See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Mexico Considers Marijuana Legalization After Ballot Wins in U.S.,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgmexico-marijuana-20130105,0,2199612.story; Killings Surge Again in Mexico, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2013.
24
TRAVEL WARNING – MEXICO, supra note 11.
25
See Benson Statement October 2011, supra note 4, at 22.
26
See TRAVEL WARNING – MEXICO, supra note 11.
27
Benson Statement October 2011, supra note 4, at 17.
28
See Mark Potter, Debate Rages Over Mexico ‘Spillover Violence’ in U.S., DAILY NIGHTLY (Mar.
15, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://dailynightly.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/15/10701978-debate-ragesover-mexico-spillover-violence-in-us?lite#.
29
See id.
30
See text accompanying notes 9-10.
31
BOB KILLEBREW & JENNIFER BERNAL, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., CRIME WARS: GANGS, CARTELS
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 37-38 (2010), available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/
publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal_3.pdf; see also Potter, supra note 28.
18

2012]

BREAKING THE MEXICAN CARTELS

295

presence “in more than 230 U.S. and Canadian cities.”32 Drug-related
kidnappings are also taking place in the United States.33 As of May 2011, “six of
the seven Mexican Cartels ha[d] established command-and-control networks in
Texas cities.”34 And, the cartel operations in the United States have a significant
impact on the corruption of U.S. Government actors. In particular, “over 70
[U.S.] CBP Agents have been arrested for corruption” in the Southwest.35
B. U.S. Policy
U.S. officials have presented a confused and unclear representation of
U.S. policy addressing the Mexican Situation. Officially, the United States has
maintained a primarily law enforcement posture as a matter of policy.36 But, as
described below, U.S. officials have, in various statements and remarks, referred
to the cartels and the Mexican Situation as “organized crime,” “terrorists,”
“national security,” “homeland security,” and “insurgency.”37 U.S. officials
acknowledge that the vast amount of U.S. drugs come from Mexico,38 but we
have not launched a new, high profile and visible public campaign to discourage
American drug use.39

32

KILLEBREW & BERNAL, supra note 31, at 39. Killebrew and Bernal make the case for a renewed
U.S. effort in light of the awful choices the Mexican Government has, which they identify as:
(i) tolerating the cartels and allowing the Mexican Government to whither, (ii) considering drug
legalization, or (iii) “favoring some cartels over others.” Id. at 6, 22; see also William A. Fix,
Kendra J. Harris & Aida A. Montanaro, Offense, Defense, or Just a Big Fence? Why Border
Security is a Valid National Security Issue: St. Mary’s University School of Law Center for
Terrorism Law, 14 SCHOLAR 741, 747 (2012).
33
Fix et al., supra note 32, at 758.
34
McCraw Statement May 2011, supra note 5, at 43.
35
Id. at 44 (the acronym CBP refers to Customs and Border Patrol).
36
KILLEBREW & BERNAL, supra note 31, at 8-10.
37
See discussion infra Part II.D.
38
See Counternarcotics Enforcement: Coordination at the Federal, State, and Local Level:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration of
the S. Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Leech
Statement April 2009] (statement of
John Leech, Acting Director for the Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security).
39
The November 2012 election votes to legalize marijuana in Colorado and Washington State
further complicate U.S. policy considerations. So far, the federal government has not changed its
policy. According to a written statement by U.S. Attorney Jenny A. Durkan for the Western
District of Washington on December 5, 2012, “The Department of Justice is reviewing the
legalization initiatives recently passed in Colorado and Washington State. The Department’s
responsibility to enforce the Controlled Substances Act remains unchanged.” Statement from U.S.
Attorney’s Office on Initiative 502, U.S. ATT’Y OFF. W.D. OF WASH. (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2012/December/Statement.html. The DEA, accordingly,
has not changed its existing position on marijuana, which is that, “Marijuana is properly
categorized under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.
The clear weight of the currently available evidence supports this classification, including evidence
that smoked marijuana has a high potential for abuse [and] has no accepted medicinal value in
treatment in the United States . . . .” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., THE
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An important study performed by the Center for a New American
Security in September 2010, found that “American policymakers . . . have been
slow to recognize the evolution of the drug cartels and gangs from a problem for
law enforcement to a strategic threat.”40 According to the report, “[n]o state in
the hemisphere is more important to U.S. security than Mexico, which is fighting
for its life against a widespread criminal insurgency. Mexican drug cartels
dominate hemisphere-wide criminal networks.”41 The report puts forth that the
United States has an obligation and should adopt a strategy to go after the cartels
within the United States, as well as throughout the Western Hemisphere.42
C. The Mérida Initiative
The increase in U.S. demand for cocaine in the 1970s led to the strength
of the Colombian cartels.43 With the successful marginalization of the
Colombian cartels in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Mexican cartels stepped in to
fill the breach.44 The current war being waged by the cartels, against each other
and the Mexican Government, heightened in 2006 when then-Mexican President
Calderón took “a more active policy” towards the drug cartel problem and
deployed the Mexican army against the cartels.45 Calderón, as the newly elected
leader from the National Action Party (“PAN”),46 launched an aggressive
campaign against the cartels.47 In doing so, he upset the status quo relationship
between the government and cartels, which had previously enabled the cartels to
operate and thrive.48 In addition to deploying his army domestically to combat
the cartels militarily, shortly after taking office in January 2007 he also facilitated
the extradition of major drug cartel kingpins, such as Gulf Cartel leader Osiel
Cardenas Guillen.49 Although Calderón’s effort has garnered some success, it
DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuana_
position_2011.pdf.
40
KILLEBREW & BERNAL, supra note 31, at 8.
41
Id. at 15.
42
Id. at 49-50. The Center recommends a “hemispheric counter-cartel strategy” incorporating
concepts of rule of law, financial tools, and military activities. Id.
43
Fix et al., supra note 32, at 745.
44
Chelluri, supra note 4, at 62 (“As the Colombian cartels were brought down, the Mexican cartels
rose to dominate the U.S. narcotics market.”); see also Fix et al., supra note 32, at 745, 759.
45
Chelluri, supra note 4, at 63; see also Fix et al., supra note 32, at 745-46.
46
Fix et al., supra note 32, at 745-46. Calderón succeeded Vincente Fox, who, when elected in
2000, ended over seventy years of continuous governance by the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(“PRI”). E.g., SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
47
See, e.g., William Finnegan, Letter from Mexico: The Kingpins: The Fight for Guadalajara, THE
NEW YORKER, July 2, 2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/07/02/
120702fa_fact_finnegan.
48
Fix et al., supra note 32, at 746 (“President Calderón’s election, and subsequent declaration of
war on the drug cartels, along with his administration’s capture of many high-ranking drug lords,
may have caused drug cartels to suddenly lose the government support and protection they
previously enjoyed for decades.”).
49
Benson Statement October 2011, supra note 4, at 23 (“[T]he [Government of Mexico] has
extradited a total of 422 criminals to the United States, as of June 25, 2011.”).
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also poked the hornets’ nest and the cartels launched a vicious counterpunch
against both Mexican Government officials and its citizens.50 In July 2012, the
candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (“PRI”), Enrique Peña Nieto,
won election to the presidency.51 Only time will tell if he will continue
Calderón’s counter-cartel initiatives during his presidency.52
The centerpiece of the United States’ policy with respect to Mexico and
cartel drug trafficking and violence is the Mérida Initiative.53 At its most broad,
the four key pillars of the Mérida Initiative are: (1) “Disrupt Organized Criminal
Groups;” (2) “Strengthen Institutions” (e.g., the judicial sector and rule of law);
(3) “Build a 21st Century Border;” and (4) “Build Strong and Resilient
Communities” (through greater support to Mexican social services and
communities).54 Instituted in 2007, the Mérida Initiative pledged $1.4 billion to
Mexico over three years, primarily for the purpose of combating drug
trafficking.55 “The U.S. Congress has appropriated $1.6 billion since the Mérida
Initiative began in Fiscal Year 2008.”56 A significant amount of Mérida funds
are used for hardware to help the Mexican forces fight the drug cartels—
particularly helicopters, surveillance equipment and military gear.57 Funds are
also used for rule of law programs such as training law enforcement and criminal

50

Id. at 22.
Associated Press, Enrique Pena Nieto Wins Mexican Election, Bring Power Back to PRI, CBS
NEWS (July 2, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57465160/enrique-penanieto-wins-mexican-election-bring-power-back-to-pri/.
52
President Peña Nieto assumed office on December 1, 2012.
53
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFF., THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: EXPANDING THE
U.S./MEXICO PARTNERSHIP (2012) [hereinafter THE MERIDA INITIATIVE], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187329.pdf.
54
Id.; see also Transnational Crime, U.S. Border Security, and the War on Drugs in Mexico:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Dr. David A. Shirk, Director of the TransBorder Institute, University of San Diego), available at http://homeland.house.gov/sites/
homeland.house.gov/files/ Testimony%20Shirk.pdf.
55
SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 2, at 8-9; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United StatesMexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact (Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Progress & Impact],
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138929.htm. Mérida was initially conceived
as a program that was not only directed at Mexico, but also allocated funds for Central America,
the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. See The Merida Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Thomas A. Shannon, Jr. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs), available at http://www.state.gov/p/ wha/rls/rm/2009/120229.htm.
56
THE MERIDA INITIATIVE, supra note 53. One academic cited Mérida as “anemic” and noted that
Mérida’s $1.4 billion over three years is less than the United States spends in Afghanistan in one
week. See The U.S. Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Ricardo C. Ainslie, Professor, University of Texas at Austin).
For a breakdown of U.S. spending for Mexican counternarcotics programs, see SCHAEFER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 49.
57
Fix et al., supra note 32, at 756.
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justice personnel, although some critics allege that not enough funding has gone
towards rule of law initiatives.58
The Mérida Initiative has had its share of successes.59 According to the
U.S. State Department, in Mexico, major cartel leaders have been arrested,
extradited or killed by authorities; and tens of thousands of tons of illicit drugs,
millions in currency, and tens of thousands of weapons have been seized.60 In
the United States, numerous interagency task forces and multi-agency operations
have led to hundreds of arrests of drug cartel operatives, millions of dollars have
been seized, and, as of 2010, nearly forty individuals had been designated under
the U.S. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”).61 Significant efforts
have been taken to train Mexican law enforcement and judicial system officials,
and the United States and Mexico have partnered to reduce arms trafficking and
money laundering.62 Joint efforts amongst the Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security and Treasury exist to facilitate anti-money laundering training programs,
including increased information sharing, improving investigative techniques,
disrupting cash couriers, implementing Mexico’s anti-money laundering laws,
and designating the cartels under the Kingpin Act to facilitate economic
sanctions.63
A variety of U.S. Government agencies are involved in
implementing the Mérida Initiative, and related counter-cartel efforts.64 These
include establishing a Southwest Border Initiative, launched in March 2009, and

58

See Chelluri, supra note 4, at 97-98.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States-Mexico Partnership: Anti-Arms Trafficking
and Anti-Money Laundering (Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Anti-Arms Trafficking], available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138924.htm.
60
Progress & Impact, supra note 55.
61
Id.; Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 598 (2012). The Kingpin Act
blocks all property and interests in property, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, owned or controlled by
significant narcotics traffickers. Recent Kingpin Act designations include actions against a
Guatemalan drug trafficker affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel (Nov. 14, 2012); a leading
organization in methamphetamine trafficking (Nov. 20, 2012); a business network affiliated with
the Sinaloa cartel (Dec. 12, 2012); and the Meza Flores Drug Trafficking Organization, which is a
major rival to the Sinaloa cartel (Jan. 17, 2013). See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
Treasury Designates Lorenzana Family Members and Businesses Allied with the Sinaloa Cartel
(Nov. 14, 2012), available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1767.aspx;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Ibarra Cardona Drug Trafficking
Organization (Nov. 20, 2012), available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1778.aspx; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Levies Additional Sanctions Against
Business Network Linked to Sinaloa Cartel Drug Lord “El Azul” (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1802.aspx; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, Treasury Designates Additional Sinaloa-Based Drug Trafficking Organization (Jan. 17,
2013), available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1824.aspx.
62
Anti-Arms Trafficking, supra note 59.
63
See id.
64
See id.
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increasing the number of ICE agents in the border.65 The Department of Defense
is also involved in training and sharing information with its Mexican
counterparts.66 Despite these and many more efforts, however, the violence has
not abated and the cartels remain strong.
It is curious that Mérida has not been more consequential. The successes
attributable to Mérida do not seem to have translated into strategic defeat of the
cartels and their influence on the public and political systems in Mexico,
violence, drug trafficking or overall state of terror they inflict on the Mexican
population. And despite a wide range of tactical successes over the last four
years, the Mexican Situation remains a strategic problem. Therefore, we need to
take another look at U.S. legal framework and policy with respect to Mexico, and
determine what changes we need to make to strategically defeat the cartels and
their influence both in Mexico and the United States.
D. From a Law Enforcement Issue to a Homeland Security Issue
Traditionally, U.S. policy classified the cartels as sophisticated criminal
organizations; the modern day versions of the Italian mafia at its peak of
influence.67 Law enforcement entities have used criminal prosecution as the
primary mechanism to support enforcement actions.68
The U.S. State
Department described the Mérida Initiative as a partnership to “fight organized

65

The U.S. Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th
Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Luis Alvarez, Assistant Director of International Affairs, Homeland
Security Investigations at the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement in the Department of
Homeland Security). Alvarez highlighted a number of initiatives and projects directed at the drug
and cartel issues. See id. These include the Southwest Border Initiative, a comprehensive effort at
border security by ICE; the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) program, led by ICE,
which brings multiple stakeholders together for border security; the San Diego Tunnel Task Force,
a BEST program that discovered tunnels and disrupted drug shipments; Operation in Plain Site,
ICE’s largest human smuggling disruption to date; Operation Firewall, an ICE cash smuggling
disruption effort; the ICE National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center, a support center located in
Vermont; Operation Pacific Rim, a bulk cash smuggling disruption; and Project Southern Tempest,
an ICE-led initiative against gangs affiliated with Mexican cartels. Id. While each of these
operations and programs has had individual successes, this listing also demonstrates that the
patchwork of law enforcement-style investigations and operations has not had the strategic victory
of breaking the cartels.
66
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Administration Officials
Announce U.S.-Mexico Border Security Policy: A Comprehensive Response & Commitment (Mar.
24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Administration-OfficialsAnnounce-US-Mexico-Border-Security-Policy-A-Comprehensive-Response-and-Commitment.
67
See Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Govermental Affairs, 111th Cong. 2, 8 (2009)
[hereinafter Arabat Statement March 2009] (statement of Joseph M. Arabat, Special Agent, Drug
Enforcement Administration & William McMahon, Deputy Assistant Director of Field Operations,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives).
68
See id. at 3.
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crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the
rule of law.”69 This approach seems in line with that put forth by John Leech, the
Acting Director of DHS’s Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (“CNE”) in
April 2009.70 Leech explained CNE’s two functions: (1) to support DHS’s drug
interdiction efforts; and (2) to “track and sever the connections between illegal
drug trafficking and terrorism.”71 In this instance, the terrorism he appears to be
referring to is the 9/11-related Islamist international terrorism.72 There have been
concerns that international terrorists, such as agents of al Qaeda or Hizballah,
would use the Mexican cartels and the security situation on the border to enter
the United States.73 To avoid this and better fulfill its functions, CNE opened a
Drug Terror Nexus Division charged with coordinating between the intelligence
agencies and law enforcement agencies to ensure that information regarding
terrorists passes to the appropriate channels.74
A Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) official similarly
emphasized the law enforcement approach, while recognizing that drug cartels
pose a national security (or perhaps domestic security) threat within Mexico. In
March 2009, DEA Special Agent in Charge Joseph Arabit characterized the
United States’ approach as attacking criminal organized crime. He outlined the
Department of Justice’s strategy as follows:
[T]he Department’s strategy—built on its proven track record in
dismantling transnational organized criminal groups, such as the mafia
in the 1980s and 1990s—confronts the Mexican cartels as criminal
organizations, rather than simply responding to individual acts of
criminal violence. Pursued vigorously, and in coordination with the
efforts of other U.S. government agencies like the Departments of State
and Homeland Security and with the full cooperation of the
Government of Mexico, this strategy can and will neutralize the
organizations causing the violence.75

While expressing a commitment that the law enforcement paradigm was the right
one, he recognized its shortcomings but attributed those to resources:
We believe that we have the right strategy for stopping the violence
spawned by the cartels. But despite recent successes, we also recognize
that we have much more work to do to implement it effectively. The
cartels remain too powerful and able to move too many drugs into the

69

Progress & Impact, supra note 55.
See Leech Statement April 2009, supra note 38.
71
Id. at 2.
72
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 66.
73
Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Mexico’s New President Continue the War on the Cartels?, RAND
CORP. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/11/will-mexicos-new-president-continuethe-war-on-the.html.
74
See Leech Statement April 2009, supra note 38, at 6.
75
Arabat Statement March 2009, supra note 67, at 1-2.
70
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United States. Too many guns and too much cash are moving south
across the border into Mexico, where they fuel the cycle of violence.
As a result, the Attorney General and I are working to allocate
additional resources to address this threat.76

But, to put the DEA position to task, the Mexican cartels of 2012 barely resemble
the Italian mafia of old. The cartels have infiltrated Mexican law enforcement
and military establishments through a pervasive corruption that was not
experienced in the United States at the height of mafia activities and influence.
The cartels are infinitely better armed, outfitted and trained in military and even
special forces-like operations, than the mafia. Further, the sophistication of the
cartels’ money laundering operations far surpasses that of the mafia.77
Perhaps recognizing that the ground was shifting, that same spring of
2009, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano seemed to go a step further
in her remarks. Napolitano stated, “[The Mexican Situation] is a homeland
security issue in which all Americans have a stake. America has a significant
security stake in the success of Mexico’s efforts against drug cartels.”78
Secretary Napolitano outlined a number of initiatives to combat the cartel
violence and provide assistance to Mexico.79 More recently, however, Secretary
Napolitano did not identify the Mexican Situation and U.S. enforcement efforts
against the cartels as one of her top priorities.80
Taking a step further away from the law enforcement approach, some
recent observers are assessing whether Mexico is undergoing an insurgency, or
an armed conflict under International Law.81 Several observers argue that the
Mexican Situation is a “noninternational armed conflict governed by Common

76

Id. at 4-5.
See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 7, at 384-86, 393 (drug cartels are “organizationally . . . almost
indistinguishable from terrorist organizations. Just as al Qaeda provides funding and training to
groups who wish to carry out its goals, [drug cartels] provide guns, drugs, and money to groups that
are willing to do its dirty work.”). Bloom suggests that, as an example, “Yemen is the terrorist
analogue to the situation in Mexico” by virtue of its weakened central government, high
unemployment numbers, poverty conditions for citizens, and few, if any natural resources. Id. at
393.
78
Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
(statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
79
Id. The initiatives presented by Napolitano include: providing “assistance to the Mexican
government in its efforts to defeat the drug cartels,” taking “action on our side of the border to
cripple smuggling enterprises,” and guarding against and preparing “for the possible spillover
violence into the United States.” Id.
80
In remarks at the Wilson Center on January 24, 2013, Secretary Napolitano discussed
cybersecurity, the coming immigration debate, and continued threat from terrorism as her top three
priorities for the next term. See From Cyber to Immigration, Terrorism to Disasters: Securing
America in the Next Administration Transcript of Event with U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, WILSON CENTER (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
janetnapolitano_jan242013.pdf.
81
See Chelluri, supra note 4.
77
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Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions” under International Law.82 This
assessment is based on the nature of the fighting amongst the cartels and between
the cartels and the Mexican Army.83
Current and former high ranking officials have acknowledged in remarks
that the Mexican Situation resembles other parts of the world in chaos. In
September 2010, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “these drug
cartels are now showing more and more indices of insurgency . . . . [I]t’s looking
more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago, where the narcotraffickers
control . . . certain parts of the country.”84 Separately, the U.S. Joint Forces
Command reported back in 2008 that Mexico (along with Pakistan) could face
collapse of the state.85 In 2010, former Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice compared the situation in Mexico to the “failed state”
status of Afghanistan and Pakistan, “The border with Mexico has the
characteristics of a failed state,” she said, noting that “Mexico has experienced
5,000 assassinations and kidnappings of officials.”86
Other observers are not willing to go as far. In July 2012, RAND expert
Brian Michael Jenkins testified that while the cartels have “in effect” created a
“criminal insurgency,” that activity does not threaten the stability of the Mexican
Government.87 He acknowledged, however, the state of terror in Mexico:
Mexico’s violence is notable not merely for the scale of killing but for
its deliberately savage quality. Kidnappings, mass killings and mass
graves are common. Victims are brutally tortured and often beheaded.
Messages are sent pinned to corpses. The purpose is terror, but the
violence exceeds what is required to eliminate rivals and intimidate
authorities.88

In January 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
devoted only three short paragraphs to Mexico in his annual Unclassified

82
Id. at 56; Bloom, supra note 7, at 365-66 (defining armed conflict as “whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”).
83
See Bloom, supra note 7, at 366; see also Terrorism and the New Age of Irregular Warfare:
Challenges and Opportunities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 48 (2009) (statement of
John Robb) (comparing the Mexican Situation with insurgencies in Iraq and Pakistan).
84
Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, Counsel on Foreign Relations: A Conversation With
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (Sept. 8, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/conversation-us-secretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p22896).
85
Chelluri, supra note 4, at 54-55.
86
M. Scott Carter, Condoleezza Rice Warns of Danger From ‘Failed States,’ DAILY RECORD
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.legalnews.com/jackson/655062.
87
New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of the Current Terrorist
Threat: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 5
(2012) [hereinafter Jenkins Statement July 2012] (statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND
Corporation).
88
Id. at 6.
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Worldwide Threat Assessment.89 His understated assessment, however, appears
at odds with other high ranking U.S. Government statements and actions, which
indicate far more grave circumstances.90 According to one report, the United
States is using drones, sophisticated surveillance equipment, and has deployed
Central Intelligence Agency operatives and retired American military personnel
to support the Mexican Army efforts.91
E. Mexican Cartels as Terrorist Organizations
A key issue in evaluating whether the U.S. policy shift should
strategically move beyond, or complement, the law enforcement model is
whether or not the cartels could, or should, be considered international terrorist
organizations under the framework of post-9/11 laws and policies that were
adopted to destroy al Qaeda and related groups. A growing group of observers

89
Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong. 23-24
(2012) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). Clapper stated that
“[t]he Mexican cartels have a presence in the United States, but we are not likely to see the level of
violence that is plaguing Mexico spill across the US border. We assess that traffickers are wary of
more effective law enforcement in the United States. . . . US officials and citizens in Mexico are at
increased risk because of generalized violence.” Id. at 24.
90
See Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National
Intelligence). Clapper’s predecessor, Dennis C. Blair, was more blunt in a 2009 appearance before
Congress:
Mexico remains the most important conduit for illicit drugs reaching the
United States. As much as 90 percent of that cocaine known to be directed
toward the United States, and some Colombian heroin, eventually transits
Mexico before entering the United States. Despite recent successful efforts to
counter precursor chemical diversion and drug trafficking, Mexico is the chief
foreign supplier of methamphetamine and marijuana to the US market and
produces most of the heroin consumed west of the Mississippi River. The
corruptive influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels, which are
among the most powerful organized crime groups in the world, impede Mexico
City’s ability to govern parts of its territory and build effective democratic
institutions.
Nearly 5,500 people—mostly cartel operatives and to a lesser degree
local police—were murdered in 2008 in cartel-related violence, far exceeding
the record of about 2,700 drug-related murders in 2007. Also, the cartels have
shown their willingness and capacity to strike Mexican Government officials,
its leadership, and the military. Nevertheless, sustained government pressure
has disrupted established transnational cocaine supply chains, interfered with
day-to-day cartel operations, and has started to fragment Mexico’s powerful
drug cartels. We assess that significantly more cocaine is diverting to Central
America before moving into Mexico, a shift that, in our judgment, mitigates
some risks drug traffickers faced in Mexico but that also complicates
trafficking operations.
Id. at 29-30.
91
Mazzetti & Thompson, supra note 21.
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believe that drug cartels could, under our laws and policies, be labeled as
international terrorist organizations.92
One southwest border sheriff who testified before Congress in March
2009 argued that residents living on the United States side of the southwest
border with Mexico are victims of the terrorism perpetrated by the cartels.93 The
sheriff testified that because border residents live in fear of the cartels and their
operatives who may enter the United States, that these residents are
“terrorized.”94 The sheriff paints a picture on the border “of an increase in
abductions, kidnappings, carjackings, home invasions, murders, and large-scale
incidents”—and these are just on the United States side—which he attributes to
spillover violence.95 He stated the cartels are not afraid of using “automatic
weapons, grenades, grenade launchers, and rocket propelled grenades” to protect
their “caches.”96
Although the cartels have not been treated under U.S. law the same way
as international terrorists affiliated with, for example, al Qaeda or Hizballah, the
term “narco-terrorism” is not a new one. The concept of “narco-terrorism” has
been used for the last quarter century to identify the tactics used by other drug
cartels, which are similar to the tactics used by international terrorist
organizations.97 Clearly, the cartels are criminal organizations under U.S. law.
They engage in murder, drug trafficking, money laundering, and assassination, at
least.98 However, as we have learned from the past decade’s approach to radical
Islamic terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, falling under the legal
definitions of criminal activity is not mutually exclusive of being engaged in
international terrorism; indeed, they are interrelated. But in recent years, it has
become clear that the additional tactics such as kidnapping, beheadings, and

92

Congressman Michael McCaul (R-TX) has been the leading proponent of designating Mexican
cartels as international terrorist organizations and has introduced legislation that would mandate
designation. See H.R. 1270, 112th Cong. (2011). Chairman Peter King, would have designated,
through legislation, the Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate foreign terrorist organizations if
certain requirements are met); see also On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law
Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Violence: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on
Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt., 112th Cong. (2011).
93
Homeland Security and Border Security Issues: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Transp. and
Homeland Sec., 2010 Leg., 82nd Sess. 4-5 (Tx. 2010) (statement of Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., Sheriff,
Zapata County, Texas).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
KILLEBREW & BERNAL, supra note 31, at 23.
The concept of “narco-terrorism” was born in Colombia in the 1980s and
1990s, when cocaine traffickers began using terrorist tactics—car bombs,
massacres of civilians, executions of political candidates and other attacks
against both law enforcement officials and civilians—to fight extradition of
convicted drug traffickers to the United States.
Id.
98
See, e.g., Jenkins Statement July 2012, supra note 87.
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torture are more similar to international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, than
anything else.99
If the cartels were assessed as international terrorist
organizations, then additional investigative and enforcement mechanisms would
be available. For example, the cartels could be designated as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (“FTOs”) by the Secretary of State,100 or they could be designated
as Specially Designated Nationals by the Secretary of the Treasury.101 The
cartels could also be targeted for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”).102
The consequences of designation are that a designated entity may be
subject to prosecution for providing material support to terrorism, removal from
the United States, or, for U.S. entities, reporting requirements.103 In addition to
the threat of criminal prosecution, designation would send a signal to the broader
international community that the cartels should be isolated, their assets frozen,
and money flows disrupted.104
There are at least two main arguments against designating the cartels as
terrorist organizations. The first is that unless it is absolutely necessary, we

99

Bloom, supra note 7, at 352-53.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189, 1153; see also Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f)(d)(2).
101
The Secretaries of State and Treasury are authorized to designate terrorist individuals and
entities. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. 595 (2001) (issued by President George W. Bush
on September 23, 2001). For purposes of the order, terrorism is defined as an activity that:
(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property or
infrastructure; and
(ii) appears to be intended—
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
Id.
102
FISA defines international terrorism as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended—
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006).
103
Press Release, Bureau of Public Affairs, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation (Sept. 1,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm; see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2339-39D (2006) (the material support statutes).
104
Press Release, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Sept. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
100
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should not apply the terrorist label to organizations or entities when they can
remain squarely under a criminal organization framework. The status quo,
however, has enabled the cartels to thrive. A second argument is that Executive
Order 13224 was really intended to address the specific threats emanating from al
Qaeda—responsible for the 9/11 attacks—or related groups, who aspired to
conduct more attacks in the days, months and years following 9/11. However,
some of the earliest designations under 13224 were of entities unrelated to al
Qaeda, for example the Real IRA (“RIRA”) or the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (“FARC”).105
Whether FISA surveillance could be used to collect foreign intelligence
on the cartels is determined by factual and legal analysis conducted by Executive
Branch officials and then either approved or disapproved by a judge on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.106 Court orders issued pursuant to FISA
authorize electronic surveillance of agents of a foreign power—in this case, an
international terrorist group.107 To qualify for surveillance under FISA when the
target of surveillance is located in the United States, the court must find, among
other findings, probable cause that the target is an agent of the international
terrorist group—in this case, a cartel.108 In 2008, Congress passed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act which enables an acquisition against
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, for foreign
intelligence purposes.109
The FAA enabled FISA to adapt to modern
technologies by facilitating acquisitions against non-U.S. persons outside the
United States, when the assistance of a U.S. communications provider is
required.110 Accordingly, FISA has several provisions which, if the cartels were
assessed as international terrorist groups under FISA (and all of the other
provisions of the statute were satisfied), could be useful in collecting foreign
intelligence information about the cartels.111

105
Id. Real IRA was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 16, 2001. Id. The
FARC was originally designated by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
in 1997 and then designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2001 pursuant to
Executive Order 13,224. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Four
Venezuelan Officials for Providing Arms and Security to the FARC (Sept. 8, 2011).
106
50 U.S.C. § 1805.
107
Id.
108
Id. There must also be a foreign intelligence surveillance purpose to the surveillance request.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
109
50 U.S.C. § 1881a, amended by 50 U.S.C § 1881(a) (Supp. I 2008).
110
Id.
111
Note that information acquired pursuant to FISA can be used in a criminal prosecution. See,
e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806. An alternative approach would be to amend FISA to include new
definitions of a foreign power and agent of a foreign power that are tailored to the Mexican cartels,
specifically, or drug cartels, more generally. While not exactly similar, this approach would be
more in line with the approach taken to amend FISA to enable collection against foreign powers
and agents of foreign powers involved in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. See
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(7), (b)(1)(E), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(7), (b)(1)(E) (Supp. I 2008).
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Despite the potential availability of the terrorist designations and FISA
surveillance in light of the activities of the cartels, there may be resistance to do
so on the part of U.S. Government entities. For instance, currently, there are
federal agencies and offices that have defined responsibilities in fighting the
cartels. Countering the cartels and drug trafficking falls into law enforcement
and homeland security lanes in the road. There may be concerns about putting
additional burdens on the agencies conducting counterterrorism investigation,
activities, and analysis against radical Islamic terrorist organizations and other
existing homeland or national security threats, both domestically and abroad.
However, in evaluating which authorities are available to use in counter-cartel
activities, caution should be exercised so that what may be bureaucratic
considerations are not presented in pseudo-legal arguments.112 As we learned in
the re-calibration of our legal approach to Islamic terrorist organizations after
9/11, just because an organization is a criminal organization does not preclude it
from being a terrorist organization; indeed, they are often both.
A significant, and legitimate, concern some may have in designating the
cartels under the definitions of international terrorism as used against al Qaeda
and related organizations since 9/11, would be the potential criminal exposure it
would pose for the millions of drug users in the United States. President
Calderón placed blame for the cartels’ wealth and growth at the feet of U.S. drug
users.113 According to the testimony of Rodney G. Benson, Assistant
Administrator and Chief of Intelligence for the DEA, “[a]lmost 38,000
Americans die each year as a direct result of drug abuse. In 2009, an estimated
23 million Americans had an active substance use disorder.”114 Americans use
nearly $64 billion worth of drugs per year.115 The drug industry itself is an over
$200 billion industry.116 Most major illicit drugs now come through Mexico,
since enforcement efforts diminished the Caribbean route via Florida.117

112

This was a phenomenon that plagued pre-9/11 counterterrorism thinking. See COMM’N ON THE
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 335 (2005) (unclassified version), available at
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restrictions on conducting intelligence operations were “either myths that overcautious lawyers had
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See Joint Meeting to Hear an Address by His Excellency Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, President of
Mexico, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of President Calderón) (stating that the origin of the cartel
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According to reports, “more than [eighty] percent of the drugs that enter the
United States”118 and “[n]inety percent of the cocaine sold in the U.S.” comes
through Mexico.119 Mexican cartels are the conduit for cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamines.120 According to the testimony of a DHS
official, “Mexico is currently the transit point for approximately 90 percent of all
cocaine consumed in the United States and is the primary source of foreign
marijuana and methamphetamine, and a major source of heroin to the United
States.”121
If the United States were to use heavy handed financial enforcement
action against the cartels, there could be significant criminal penalty exposure for
U.S. drug consumers.122 For example, if drug cartels were designated as terrorist
organizations, then drug consumers in the United States could potentially be
exposed to prosecution under the material support statutes, which are serious
federal offenses carrying heavy sentencing ranges.123 Exposing drug users to
these penalties could have dramatic effects—it would either serve as an
incredible deterrent to recreational drug use, or it would cause a public outcry
that terrorist support statutes were being applied to U.S. citizens who have an
addiction problem, which may be viewed from a medical and public health
perspective. But on the deterrent side, reframing the cartels in the terrorist (or,
insurgency) category could have an effect on the United States’ outlook towards
drug use. Similar to the “blood diamond” argument deterring consumers from
buying conflict diamonds, if U.S. recreational drug users, or those who think
drug use is a benign personal choice, viewed their activities as fueling insurgent
and/or terrorist organizations that are torturing and murdering thousands of
people, and contributing to the destruction of a nation, perhaps the public mood
in the United States regarding drug use could change.
III. A NEW POLICY TO BREAK THE MEXICAN CARTELS
In the summer of 2011, the Obama administration somewhat clarified its
approach to the Mexican Situation. Instead of creating a government-wide
national strategy that focused specifically on the Mexican Situation, the
Administration addressed transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”)
worldwide, issuing a new Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in
July 2011.124 This approach recognized that a government-wide strategy is
118
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needed to address the TCOs, staying away from bringing the cartels and the
Mexican Situation into the terrorism framework.125 Accordingly, instead of using
existing authorities related to terrorism to block assets of the cartels, the
President issued new Executive Order 13581126 to block the property of several
TCOs, including Los Zetas.127
The Strategy is a start. On one hand, it at least serves the purpose of
articulating what the current policy approach is towards the Mexican cartels—
continue to treat them as sophisticated criminal organizations—but recognizes
that their activities have an impact on the security of the United States. It also
raises the profile of government efforts against TCOs, and signals to the
international community that the United States considers this issue important and
is devoting resources and new investigative, security, intelligence, and
information-sharing initiatives to improve our success in degrading the
capabilities and influence of TCOs.
But the Strategy focuses on TCOs worldwide, and therefore the Mexican
cartels are just one aspect of the effort. By including the Mexican cartels as just
one of many TCOs involved in all sorts of criminal activity—not just drug
trafficking, but money laundering, human smuggling, cybercrime, arms
trafficking, and intellectual property theft—the Strategy necessarily is at a very
high level of generality. As government veterans know, these types of bird’s eye
strategic plans are difficult to translate into measurable results on the ground.
The U.S. Government needs to get serious about breaking the Mexican
cartels. The Mérida Initiative and its implementation have had a number of
tactical successes, but the cartels remain strong. We need a new, transparent,
coordinated, strategic approach that melds law enforcement tools with additional
investigative, intelligence, and military resources and abilities that would come
from adopting a comprehensive homeland security approach. There are several
places to start.
At a strategic level, the new policy would recognize that increased
involvement in the Mexican Situation is important for U.S. homeland security
[T]hose self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate
transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or
commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their
activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting
their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the
exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.
Id.
125

A distinguishing feature the Administration highlights is that TCOs “have economic gain as
their primary goal” as opposed to the political goals of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, or Hamas,
which seek to alter the geo-political landscape through the destruction of the United States, and
Israel, respectively. See id.
126
Exec. Order No. 13,581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,757 (July 24, 2011).
127
Interestingly, the other Mexican cartels were not included in the order, again supporting the
argument that current U.S. policy is not aggressively trying to defeat the Mexican cartels. See
Chelluri, supra note 4. Similarly, La Familia was separately designated a “significant foreign
narcotics trafficker” under the Kingpin Act. See Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-08 (2006); see also Finnegan, supra note 8.
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interests, as well as humanitarian reasons in Mexico. The U.S. Government
should adopt a whole-of-government strategic plan tailored specifically to the
challenge of breaking the Mexican cartels. The United States has a strong
tradition—one that is fundamental to our modern national identity—of law
enforcement, intelligence and/or military involvement when innocent civilians
are living in terror.128 To date, official U.S. statements generally stop short of
acknowledging the severity of the Mexican Situation.
Under this new approach, the United States would need to attack the
cartels financially, with all available means. This would mean giving serious
consideration to allowing the State and Treasury Departments to designate
Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, and using all existing laws and
investigative authorities available. Alternatively, all of the major Mexican cartels
should be designated under Executive Order 13581. The piecemeal approach
that appears to be taken so far is far less effective as a signal of seriousness of
purpose as a full court press. In order to have a meaningful effect, the financial
enforcement should be part of an overall strategy, instead of incremental
designations of cartel leaders or facilitators. And, the financial enforcement
should be as robust as the law permits.
Next, the U.S. Government should enhance the physical security on the
border with a priority on stopping drug trafficking. This may involve providing
more substantial military assistance to border patrol efforts on the southern
border and/or reallocating resources to enhance border patrol operations. It is
hard to believe that the U.S. Government is not physically capable of securing
our own border; it is more likely that the problem is that the harder the force we
use the more impact there will be on the flow of people and commerce. Opting
on the side of enabling the free flow of people and commerce, we have chosen to
limit our border protection efforts to the use of civilian and law enforcement
forces. Alternatively, we could use U.S. Armed Forces or the National Guard to
secure the border, which would have an actual, as well as a deterrent effect. And,
once we acknowledge publicly that we are ramping up our efforts against the
Mexican cartels, we could quietly increase our use of intelligence resources to
support that effort.
Further, increased use of Intelligence Community and overall
intelligence collection efforts should be assessed at a senior policy level, and then
implemented. Currently there are many initiatives, task forces, designation
efforts and operations, but there does not appear to be—at least from an
outsider’s optic—a coordinated implementation of a strategy specifically aimed
at breaking the Mexican cartels. Domestically, an additional step we could take
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An unanticipated and potentially nightmarish bureaucratic scenario could arise if Mexican
citizens, tired of living in terror, filed en mass for political asylum in the United States. See Fix et
al., supra note 32, at 751 (stating that “[a]lthough the approval rate for Mexicans seeking asylum
currently lies at two percent despite rampant violence at the borders, immigration courts are
worried that an increase in the number of applications might completely overwhelm a system that is
already overloaded.”).
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is to leverage existing state and local fusion centers to play a larger role in
supporting counter-drug and counter-cartel operations and related information
sharing. Post-9/11, local and state law enforcement authorities set up fusion
centers.129 The centers were originally conceived as locations where federal,
state, local and tribal officials would come together to share information
concerning potential terrorist threats.130 Drug interdiction, gang investigation,
information sharing, and breaking the cartels could serve as an effective use of
fusion centers for the next five to ten years.131 And as a critical homeland
security issue, the effort would fit appropriately under the DHS umbrella. Drug
related crime and information sharing is a good example of an effort that requires
a combined effort of state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement, in addition
to intelligence and military involvement—just the type of function the fusion
centers can provide. And a main advantage is that the groundwork has already
been laid at fusion centers to share information and work towards a common
homeland security problem.132
Finally, the United States should launch a new domestic effort against
illegal drug use. Over at least the last half century, the country has gradually
accepted illegal drug use as a fact of American life. Legalization, which was
generally a fringe view in the 1980s and 1990s, is increasingly becoming
accepted as a legitimate proposal and, at the end of 2012, initiatives to legalize
have passed in two states.133 A new education and public awareness campaign

129

See State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). Fusion centers were a
logical reaction to a post-9/11 environment where information sharing was difficult in the
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DHS and DOJ issued recommended guidelines, the guidelines were not mandatory. DHS provided
a funding source, but did not fund a hundred percent of center activity. So, in the years subsequent
to 9/11, each fusion center developed organically in its own way—some created at the state level,
some at the local level. Some adopted a primary goal of counterterrorism, others of deterring
general crime. Over the years, some fusion centers have moved towards an “all crimes, all
hazards” mission, vice a counterterrorism mission. Id.
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Id.
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should be launched to protect the growing generation from not only ruining their
own lives and families through drug use, but contributing to a security threat
within the United States, and to the disintegration of a stable government and
thriving society in Mexico.

